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Killed by Asbestos
Abstract
Asbestos is a fiberlike insulation material that causes cancer and respiratory diseases, namely
mesothelioma and asbestosis (Times, 1994). The victims of asbestos, which include people of all
occupations, fiom asbestos-textile workers to secretaries at public schools, have no hope for a cure for
their illness which causes extreme pain and possibly death for its victims. It has been estimated that
some 200,000 asbestos-related claims have been resolved thus far, with 200,000 more still pending and
50 to 60 new claims being filed each day (Snyder, 1994). This paper will explore asbestos issues by
looking at the history of the asbestos problem, recent events in the industry, and how the problem is
changing.

This article is available in The Park Place Economist: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol4/iss1/14

- ,
5-

--.
I

* .

EL1S.L

-.

Killed by Asbestos
Matt Mikulcik

"Tragically,nothing can be done. There is no curefor either mesothelioma or asbestosis, a
thickening of the fiber of the lungs. 7he victims usuallyfeel no ill efjects until they suddenlyfind
themselves short of breath. The worst afjected waste away and eventually die in an agonizing,
choking ~pamt" ~ o n o m i s t1995).
,

I. INTRODUCTION
Asbestos is a fiberlike insulation material
that causes cancer and respiratory diseases,
namely mesothelioma and asbestosis (Times,
1994). The victims of asbestos, which include
people of all occupations, fiom asbestos-textile
workers to secretaries at public schools, have
no hope for a cure for their illness which
causes extreme pain and possibly death for its
victims. It has been estimated that some
200,000 asbestos-related claims have been
resolved thus far, with 200,000 more still
pending and 50 to 60 new claims being filed
each day (Snyder, 1994). This paper will
explore asbestos issues by looking at the
history of the asbestos problem, recent events
in the industry, and how the problem is
changing.

IL HISTORY
While attention to the dangers of asbestos
has only occurred relatively recently, asbestos
has been around for a long time. The first time

that adverse ~ e c t as
s a result of asbestos
were noticed and recorded was in the fist
century. The Greek geographer Strabo and
the Roman naturalist Pliny the Elder both
noticed a "sickness of the lungs in slaves
whose task it was to weave asbestos into
cloth" (Brodeur, 1985). They were not
concerned with the possibility that asbestos
might be a health hazard but were instead
enthralled by its "magical properties" that its
delicate fibers "not only can withstand the

fiercest heat but are so soft and flexible that
they can be spun and woven as easily as fibers
of cotton" (Brodeur, 1985). It was these
amazing properties that brought asbestos into
the modem world. During the industrial
revolution, the properties of asbestos led it to
be used extensively as an insulator. The fact
that it might be dangerous had been long
forgotten.
Information on the dangers of asbestos
resurficed in 1900. Dr. H. Montague Murray,
a physician in London's Charing Cross
Hospital, was able to establish a presumptive
connection between asbestos and sever
pulmonary fibrosis, a respiratory disease. He
had performed a post-mortem examination on
a worker who had dealt with asbestos for
fourteen years and had found the cause of his
death to be linked to asbestos (Brodeur,
1985). In 1924, the first clear case of death
due to asbestos was established by Dr. W. E.
Cooke.
Between 1928 and 1929 an
investigation of asbestos-textile workers was
conducted by Dr. E. R.A. Merewether that
found that the incidence of fibrosis increased in
direct proportion to the number of years
worked to the point where 81% of those
employed twenty or more years had it
(Brodeur, 1985).
None of these findings or others like them
did anything to interrupt the flow of business
in the asbestos industry. It wasn't until 1961,
nearly two thousand years after the possible
negative effects of asbestos had been first
noticed, that the first case was bought against
the asbestos industry. Claude J. Tomplait,
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who had worked in the asbestos industry about
twenty-five years, brought a claim against his
employers Annstrong Contracting & Supply
Corporation, Industrial Insulators, the JohnsManville Corporation, and the Aber Company,
and thereby brought a claim against their
insurers the Travelers Insurance Company, the
Texas Employers' Insurance Association, and
the Queen Insurance Company of America
(Brodeur, 1985). He was filing for workers
compensation for the illness he developed due
to asbestos, but his claim was denied on the
basis that he failed to establish his illness
developed on the job. He then filed a lawsuit
for disability and asked for the maximum
amount of $14,035. He ended up settling out
of court with the insurance companies for a
total of $7,500, a very small amount for his
disability. He then proceeded to sue the
m a n u f ~ e r of
s the asbestos insulation which
he had worked with.

"Since no one knew for sure
how great the exposure to
asbestos was, no one knew
what the damages would be."
To win he needed to show that the
man-ers,
mainly Fibreboard, should have
foreseen the dangers and warned the users of
their products (Brodeur, 1985). To support
his case, Tomplait had a testimony from Dr.
Selikoff that during the span of time that
Tomplait worked "literally hundreds of studies
on the relation between asbestos-dust
exposure and the occurrence of asbestosis
were published by independent academic and
scientific investigatorsy' (Brodeur, 1985).
These studies should have alerted the
manufacturers of the dangers associated with
asbestos, and they therefore should have
warned the users of asbestos. His case fell
through, however, when he could not

remember precisely on what jobs he had used
Fibreboard products. The same strategy
worked in the case Borel v. Fibreboard which
immediately followed the Tomplait case. The
case argued successfblly that Fibreboard
products were unreasonably dangerous
"because they did not carry adequate warnings
of the foreseeable dangers associated with
them" (Brodeur, 1985). The Borel case set
the precedent for many, many cases that were
to follow as Fibreboard, and therefore its
insurer, had been found liable for the asbestos
claim.
IIL RECENTLY

After the success of the Borel case, people
who had been sickened by asbestos started to
come forward. Case after case came, and in
almost all instances the injured person won.
The enonnous number of these cases that
might still come in is not known, but Dr.
Selikoff has estimated "that among the twentyone million living American men and women
who had been occupationally exposed to
asbestos between 1940 and 1980 there would
be between eight and ten thousand deaths fiom
asbestos-related cancer for each of the next
twenty years" (Brodeur, 1985). This is a huge
amount of potential liability, and that does not
even include those who are injured by asbestos
but do not die. Paul Brodeur writes that in the
1980's "it was recognized in financial circles
that asbestos litigation was going to cause a
hemorrhage of serious, if not catastrophic,
proportions in the assets of asbestos-insulation
manufacturers and their insurers" (Brodeur,
1985) and the main reason for this was
uncertainty. It was going to be hard for the
insurers to set aside reserves if they did not
know what kind of losses to expect. Since no
one knew for sure how great the exposure to
asbestos was, no one knew what the damages
would be.
With this possibility for huge losses comes
the desire not to be the one who has to pay the

claims. The manufhchrers have been trying to
pass the bill on to the insurers, the insurers are
trying to avoid getting it, and if they do get it,
the insurers are trying to get other insurers to
pay for it.
Most of the manufacturers of asbestos
insulation had bought insurance to protect
them from any potential lawsuits that might
occur. As the lawsuits come in, the
manufacturers are trying to collect on their
policy. They claim that they bought the
insurance so that it would cover problems such
as these, and so they want to collect. For
example, Fibreboard, in attempt to protect the
company, "bought two no-limit insurance
policies that could save the company" (Forbes,
1993) in light of all the cases brought against
it.
The insurance companies are fighting these
claims. The insurance companies are trying to
argue that there was no way they could have
had knowledge about the potential dangers of
asbestos, and that when selling the policies,
manukturers withheld information about the
dangers. As a result, they claim that the
policies are fraudulent and therefore the
manufacturers are responsible to pay the
claims. Sometimes this argument works. For
example, an appellate court has ruled that
insurers of Owens-Illinois Inc. (0-1) "may
have cause to argue that they were
fraudulently misled by the company over its
potential future asbestos liability" (Otis, 1993).
The courts ruled that 0-1's losses were
expected and intended due to prior knowledge
of the dangers of asbestos, and therefore the
insurers are not liable. This is the exception
though, not the rule. In most cases, the court
has ruled against the insurers. In one extreme
case dealing with Commercial Union
insurance,Judge Giles is reported to have said
"[wlhat is it that Commercial Union could not
have discovered using its own research with
respect to asbestos? What research could it
not have done? What intelligence did it not
have?" (Brodeur, 1985). While allegations

such as these may seem rather harsh, generally
they are relevant. Many insurers have known
for a long time the dangers of asbestos, and
Brodeur points out that discovering it was "a
simple matter of studying their actuarial tables
and discovering that the [asbestos] workers
were experiencing premature deaths"
(Brodeur, 1985). The insurance companies by
and large knew of the dangers when they
wrote their policies, which is why their claim
of ignorance tends to fail. They had made the
decision to collect the premiums from the
asbestos insurance, invest, make a nice profit,
and have money left to pay the claims when
they came in. This strategy was working for
years, but after the Bore1 case, expenses got to
be too much as the claims started piling up.
As a result, the insurers have made their best
effort to get out of the market but have
generally failed.
Eventually realizing that they were going
to have to pay the claims, insurers changed
from pointing the finger at the manufactwen
to pointing the fhger at other insurers. The
insurers came up with two different theories in
the 1980's on how to determine who should
the exposure theory and the
pay
manifestation theory. The exposure theory
holds that "all insurers providing coverage to
the asbestos manufacturer during the period
the injured person was exposed to the asbestos
should share the cost of indemnifjing and
defending the policyholder" (Snyder, 1994).
This also meant that the manufacturer would
have to contribute if there were periods that
the manufacturer was self-insured. On the
other hand, the d e s t a t i o n theory holds that
"the insurer covering the manufacturer when
the disease became clinically evident must
indemnifj, and defend the policyholder"
(Snyder, 1994). This also meant that as there
was no coverage at the time of manifestation,
the manufacturer would have to pay the
required compensation.
Which theory a particular company was in
favor of depended on how their asbestos

-
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insurance was written. If the company had
written a lot of coverage in the latter part of
the century, they were likely to be in favor of
the exposure theory. The exposure theory
spreads out the burden more, and a late
entering company was not likely to get burned.
If they had Mitten most of their coverage in
the early part of the century, the company was
likely to be in favor of the manifestation
theory. They were hoping that the late
comP&es would have to pay the buk
of the claims. The courts initially favored the
exposure theory, but then they switched to a
new theory. This new theory, the triple-trigger
theory, holds that "all of the manufacture?^
insurers during the periods of exposure to
asbestos, the subsequent periods of the
development of the disease and the
manifestation of it should provide coverage"
(Snyder, 1994). The courts realized that
asbestos was a disease that took time to
develop, and therefore felt it was unfair to
place the burden of compensation on a single
insurer. They felt that the responsibility to
cover should be spread out, initially spreading
it out to earlier insurers and then recently
expanding it to include all the insurers
involved.

IV. CHANGES
There are three noteworthy changes that
are occurring in the asbestos industry. The
first change comes in the composition of the
bodily injury claimants. Asbestos claims have
traditionally come fiom people who have
worked with asbestos, but "while the first
torrents of asbestos bodily injury claims have
come fiom workers in shipyards and
construction sites who were directly exposed
to the deadly substance, this . . . wave could
entail claims fiom just about anyone" (Wojcik,
1993). The type of people claiming damages
is changing. There have been more than
250,000 lawsuits filed by people that have
been "exposed" to asbestos and there are at

least another 200,000 expected (Wojcik,
1993). These lawsuits are being filed by
people who did not work directly with
asbestos, but rather were exposed to it as an
unknowing side effect of the job they chose.
These people can include anyone fiom a
secretary exposed through fibers filtering
through the air ducts to maintenance workers
exposed to asbestos insulation around leaky
water pipes (Wojcik, 1993).

"There have been more than
250,000 lawsuits filed by
people that have been
'exposed' to asbestos and
there are at least another
200.000 expected."
The second change is fiom a focus on
bodily injury to a focus on property. On
November 7, 1994, an Illinois appellate court
ruled that insurers of United States Gypsum
Company were liable for $600 million in
asbestos property claims (Times, 1994).
Claims had been brought against United States
Gypsum for asbestos removal and damages,
and the courts ruled that the insurers would
have to pay. The court ruled that "dl policies
in effect fiom the date of installation to the
date of removal of asbestos-containing
products provide coverage" (Times, 1993), in
effect following the triple-trigger theory that
was applied to bodily injury claims. This is a
significant blow to insurers since according to
Garry Chandler there seems to be a "shifting to
claims regarding property damage and
asbestos abatement...where asbestos removal
involves possible business interruption and
financial loss" (Chandler, 1992). The reason
this is significant is that asbestos is a common
material found in many buildings. It is used in
many building materials such as acoustical
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ceiIiing treatment, "popcorn" ceilings, thermal
insulation, plaster, drywall, floor tile, ceiling
tile. and 3.600 other building materials
(Gudet, 1995). With asbestos so common,
and the concern about health effects so strong,
a lot of abatement has occurred and will
continue to occur. Wtth this abatement comes
significant costs which includes both the
expense of getting the work done and the
possible loss of resources. If a commercial
building has to be closed for a period of time
so the asbestos can be removed, this will be
expensive in terms of cost of loss of use. To
recover these losses, companies are turning to
the asbestos companies and manufacturers,
which are now turning to the insurers. With
the prevalence of asbestos, the insurers are
going to have to change their concern fiom
just bodily injury to include property as well in
order to prepare for the hture wave of claims.
The third change is occurring in the way
people are dealing with asbestos. Companies
that have an asbestos problem in their
buildings are starting to look to means other
than property insurance to deal with their risk.
They are changing to an asbestos control
approach. Asbestos removal is expensive and
Joseph Gaudet writes that "the mere existence
of asbestos does not mean occupants of the
building are in danger" (Gaudet, 1995). If
handled correctly and if the asbestoscontaining materials are kept in good
condition, he feels that "asbestos is a
manageable hazard." This is a very delicate
situation, however, and must be dealt with
extreme caution.
Gaudet recommends
following an operations and maintenance
(O&M) program which should include
"employee awareness training, periodic
inspection protocols, extensive recordkeeping, personnel and air monitoring,
maintenance techniques, emergency response
and emergency contact" (Gaudet, 1995). The
risk managers have to be very carefbl and
make sure that everything is handled correctly
to maintain safety and to minimize exposure.

The advantages to controlling the asbestos
rather than immediately removing it are twofold-- 1)it allows time to budget for the
removal and 2)"even the EPA h& taken the
posture that managing asbestos in place can
sometimes be better than removing it"
(Wojcik, 1993). By removing the asbestos,
the particles have the potential to get shaken
loose and to start circulating in the air. By
controlling it, the company has more time to
plan an efficient and effective way to remove
the asbestos. John Dietrichs is quick to point
out that while an O&M program "allows
building owners to put off abatement until a
later date" it is important to keep in mind "that
while O&M is an inexpensive alternative
compared to total abatement, it is only a
temporary one" (Chain, 1993). The O&M
program is just a means to an end, since
eventually all the asbestos will have to be
removed.
V. CONCLUSION

Asbestos is a material that has ruined many
lives, yet if any of the major insurers of the
asbestos industry "had gone public with their
inside knowledge, they might have been able
to save tens of thousands of lives and untold
suffering and pain" (Brodeur, 1985). The
insurers knew of the dangers of asbestos, as
did the manufacturers at a later date, yet none
of them felt inclined to release this information
to the public. To have done so would have
undoubtedly resulted in a huge rush of claims
as people experiencing adverse affects fiom
asbestos came forth. The insurers decided to
take a risk and try to keep things quite, and
now they are regretting their decision as the
number of claims filed is well beyond what it
would have been earlier. With the hundreds of
thousands of liability claims already in, the
thousands more still coming in, and the
property claims starting to reach respectable
levels, the companies that wrote insurance for
asbestos liability are not in a good position.
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Only time can tell what the uncertain fbture
will hold, but it does not look bright for
asbestos insurers.
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Risk Associated With Different College Majors
Dan Scholz

L INTRODUCTION
There have been numerous studies to show
that students in engineering, and scientifically
oriented fields typically have higher average
earnings than students in broader studies l i e
the humanities and English (Altonji, 1993;
Angle and Wissrnann, 1981; Berger, 1988
"cohort"; Reed and Miller, 1970). The
question arises as to why there is a diierence.
While there are probably many different
factors for the wage differentials, risk must be
considered one of those factors. If diierent
risks are associated with different majors, it
would certainly be feasible that wage
differentials would arise.
What leads to different magnitudes of risk?
Presumably the job-spdc training inherent in
the field of study would play a large role in
determining the amount of risk. Gary Becker
has touched on this issue when analyzing the
returns to job specific training and general
training within a firm. Becker defined general
training as "being usefbl to many firmsbesides
those providing it" (Becker, 1975, p.19),
whereas job-specific training is only useful to
one firm. This logic can be extended a step
hrther to include types of education. Liberal
arts-type educations should provide the
equivalent of general training which can be
applied to many different fields, while
technical-type educations should be usefbl to
only a few fields in the same manner as jobspecific training. If a technically educated
individual desires to try histher hand at another
field, or is forced to for the lack of job
opportunity within hidher own field, it is likely
that they will not be as apt as others with
broader, more malleable educations. Hence
they will suffer "risk" from specific training.
In Becker's analysis, he finds that general

training will not result in increased wages paid
by the employer, but job-specific training will.
This is because the general training can be
utilized by other firms, while the specific
training cannot. With similar logic it can be
hypothesized that those in technical fields
should earn a higher wage on average, while
those with liberal arts educations should earn
less on average. Because of the limited
application of technical fields, they are
presumed to have more risk. The presence
and magnitude of this risk is to be studied
here. Does this risk really exist, and if so what
fields are considered the least and most risky?
It would be of great interest to determine
the relative riskiness of different majors. If
there is a significant difference in risk, risk can
be considered an important determinant of
wages in certain fields of study. From this,
students and others will be able to make more
informed decisions when it comes to
evaluating different career choices. If it is
determined that there is no significant risk
associated with higher average wages, then
alternative explanations for wage differentials
can be pursued.

IL DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY AND
RELATED WORK
It has been established in the literature that
investment in education will yield a higher
return in terms of average earnings. This is
consistent with human capital theory
developed largely by Becker, which says that
increasing one's ability, or human capital,
increases one's productivity and thus a higher
return on this capital may be demanded by the
individual (Ehrenberg and Smith 1991). In
fact this has been the case in many recent
studies. Joseph G. Altonji (1993) finds that

